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ANTITRUST & PROFESSIONAL SPORTS'
ELIGIBILITY RULES: THE PAST, THE
PRESENT, AND THE FUTURE
I. INTRODUCTION
Sports leagues and associations establish guidelines to retain con-
trol over who is eligible to compete,1 and what type of equipment is
allowed or required. Over the years, the courts have analyzed vari-
ous professional sports eligibility. rules to determine whether they
violate the antitrust laws. Usually the rule is challenged under Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.2 If the league and its clubs
apply an exclusionary rule, and thus refuse to deal with a player, in
essence, they may deprive a professional athlete of the opportunity
to pursue his livelihood.3 Similarly, product specifications may de-
prive a manufacturer of the opportunity to market his product if the
product does not comply with such specifications.4 The courts have
not delineated clear standards to determine whether such rules vio-
late federal antitrust laws, for the most part because whether a rule
is to be seen as violative or not depends largely on the circum-
stances.5 In most of the cases which have been brought, the plaintiff
was excluded from participating in a sport and challenged the
league's rule by characterizing its enactment as a group boycott or
concerted refusal to deal.
The courts have held that the antitrust laws are applicable to all
professional sports leagues and associations 6 except for professional
1. See, e.g., R. Berry and G. Wong, LAw AND Busnmss or nix SporRS INusTRms
349 (Vol. 1 1986). The authors identify two categories for exclusion: (1) status -
age, education, attainment, physical condition, objectified standard of skill; and (2)
activities - gambling, cheating.
2. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states "[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15
U.S.C. S 1 (1982). A "combination", according to BLAcK's LAw DICTiONARY (5th ed.
1979), is "[ain agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the
form of a contract.. .or other form of association, for the purpose of unduly restrict-
ing competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, con-
trolling its production, distribution, and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom
of trade without statutory authority." (citing Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904)).
3. See, e.g., G. Schubert, R. Smith, and J. Trentadue, SPoRTs LAw 59 (1986)
[Hereinafter Spo'rrs LAw].
4. See infra notes 123-42 and accompanying text.
5. Sporrs Law, supra note 3, at 60.
6. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (vol-
ume of interstate business sufficient to place organized professional football within
the provisions of the Antitrust Acts); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadel-
phia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey); Robertson v. Na-
tional Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (basketball).
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baseball,7 and have applied two tests in reviewing sports rules: the
"per se" illegality rule s and the "rule of reason."9 The specific test
applied by a court relates more to the jurisdiction and date of the
decision than to the particular sport scrutinized. If the per se rule
applies in a particular situation, then the rule will be struck down as
illegal, usually without any further analysis. If the per se rule does
not apply, the court must determine under the rule' of reason,
whether or not the rule unreasonably restrains trade.
This note first gives a brief overview of the general Supreme
Court developments in antitrust law relating to group boycotts and
concerted refusals to deal.'0 Since few sports cases have been ac-
tively reviewed by the Supreme Court, the district and appellate
courts have had to speculate, often relying on non-sports cases to
guide them in applying antitrust laws in sports cases. Secondly, this
note outlines the development of the "rule of reason" as applied to
sports eligibility rules." Although the trend has been towards the
application of such an analysis, various district and appellate courts
have either attempted to distinguish their cases from Supreme Court
precedent, or have simply ignored prior rulings to avoid its applica-
tion. Thirdly, this note discusses various eligibility rules which have
been challenged, as well as the outcome of such litigation. 2 Lastly,
this note concludes with the prediction that the future of sports anti-
trust litigation'" will reflect the Chicago School approach; that is,
since there must be proof of an effect on prices or output to strike a
rule, 14 it is unlikely that players will ever successfully challenge a
particular eligibility requirement.
7. See, e.g., Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (baseball immune from antitrust laws);
Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (more harm from overruling
Federal Baseball than in upholding a ruling, which although of dubious validity,
has not been changed by Congress. Note that Congress did consider the extension
of the baseball rule to other sports. In 1951 four separate bills were introduced to
exempt organized professional sports from the antitrust laws. None of them were
enacted. See H.R. RiP. No. 4229, 4230, 4231, and S. Rp. No. 1526, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1951).
8. See, e.g., Robertson v. National Basketball Association, 389 F. Supp. at 893.
9. See, e.g., United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323
(E.D. Pa. 1953).
10. See infra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 40-84 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 85-192 and accompanying text.'
13. See infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
14. This note excludes analysis of the labor law exemption as applied to sports
eligibility cases. Analysis of the player draft and the reserve clause has been mini-
mized due to their interdependence with the labor law.
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II. HISTORY OF ANTITRUST LAW: SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS
When the Sherman Act"5 incorporated the common-law princi-
ples on restraint of trade into federal statutory law, it imported both
the principle that restrictions on competition are illegal, and theex-
ception that a showing of reasonableness will, in some circum-
stances, "legalize" restrictions on competition.16 In 1911,17 the
Supreme Court established the "rule of reason" when it held that
not all restraints of interstate commerce fell within the scope of the
Sherman Act. Only those contracts and combinations which "unrea-
sonably" or "unduly" restrained trade were prohibited. In 1918,
the Court further delineated the rule of reason test, by differentiat-
ing between a restraint which "merely regulates" and that which
may "suppress or even destroy competition."' 8
However, in response to attempts by antitrust defendants to justify
every restrictive combination as reasonable, the courts developed
the doctrine of "per se" violations, 19 i.e., acts which were held to
violate the antitrust laws regardless of any asserted justifications or
alleged reasonableness.20 This per se classification encompassed
certain practices seen by the Court as eliminating competition. In
1958, the Court stated:
the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress .... 21 How-
15. See supra note 2.
16. See People v. Santa Clara Valley Bowling Proprietors' Ass'n, 238 Cal. App.
2d 225, 47 Cal. Rptr. 570 (Dist. Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1965).
17. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
18. In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), the Court
stated:
[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and thereby perhaps promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopt-
ing the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant fadts.
Id. at 238.
19. See, e.g., Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d
732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
20. Some of the practices which the courts have deemed to be unlawful per se
are price fixing, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
division of markets, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898), a 'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); group boycotts, Fashion Originators' Guild v.
F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457 (1941); and tying arrangements, International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
21. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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ever, there are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and there-
fore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use.22
The principle of per se unreasonableness avoids the requirement of
a complicated economic investigation.
In 1959, the Supreme Court held that group boycotts were within
the per se category. 23 This was true regardless of whether the elim-
ination of the plaintiff would have any significant economic effect. 2 '
The innate illegality of a boycott sprung from the combination - the
agreement to do collectively that which any one acting alone and
independently could do without violating the law.25
The possibility that all group boycotts were not per se illegal was
given considerable impetus in 1963.26 The Court stated that "a!.
sent any justification derived from the policy of another statute or
otherwise," a boycott was a per se violation of the antitrust laws.27
Thus, the Court recognized that a justification derived from another
statute "or otherwise" might save a collective refusal to deal from
per se illegality. This implied that a rule of reason analysis would
then be appropriate.28
More recently, in 1977,29 the Court has reiterated that "[pier se
rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct
22. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
23. See 1lor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Plain-
tiff, an appliance dealer, alleged that a conspiracy not to sell to plaintiff existed
between a number of suppliers and a retail competitor.
24. Id. at 213. A group boycott which has "monopolistic tendency" can not "be
tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small
that his destruction makes little difference to the economy. Monopoly can as surely
thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen, one at a time, as it can by
driving them out in large groups." Also, the boycott could not be saved by allega-
tions that it was reasonable in the specific circumstances. Id. at 212.
25. Id. at 212-13. Group boycotts may take the form of vertical or horizontal
combinations. A horizontal combination exists when companies at one level of dis-
tribution combine to exclude a direct competitor from the market. 2 VoN Kumow-
--, AuTnm LAS mn Taw, RowuAmow § 6.02(1)(c) (1990). A vertical
combination exists when companies at different marketing levels combine to ex-
clude competitors of some members of the combination from the market. Id.
26. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). Silver, a non-
member of the Exchange, had been allowed to maintain direct telephone and tick-
ertape connections with Exchange members. The Exchange directed these mem-
bers to discontinue this service, and the members filed an antitrust suit alleging
illegal group boycott.
27. Id. at 348-49.
28. See, e.g., M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 980
(lot Cir. 1984). The Silver Court found no justification for the termination because
Silver was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard, and thus the Exchange
was acting beyond its self-regulatory ends. Silver, 373 U.S. at 364-65.
29. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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that is manifestly anticompetitive.' 30
In its only recent sports antitrust case,3 1 the Supreme Court held
that it was inappropriate to apply a per se rule. The Court so rea-
soned because the industry involved was college football, therefore
horizontal restraints on competition were required if the product was
to be available at all.3 2 The Court stated that the "hypothesis that
legitimizes the maintenance of competitive balance as a procompe-
titive justification under the rule of reason is that equal competition
will maximize consumer demand for the product."3 3
The Supreme Court, in 1985,34 interpreted Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange ("Silver") and the application of the per se rule.3S
30. Id. at 49-50 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). The Conti-
nental T. V. Court held that vertical restraints were not necessarily illegal per se, but
were to be evaluated under the rule of reason, since vertical restrictions possess
"redeeming virtue[s]" in their stimulation of inter-brand competition. Id. at 49-50.
If a restraint is found to have legitimate business purposes which promote competi-
tion, the "anticompetitive evils" of the challenged practice must be carefully bal-
anced against its "procompetitive virtues" to ascertain whether the former
outweigh the latter. Id. at 57. This is as opposed to horizontal restraints, which
have been labeled "'naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling com-
petition,'" and are therefore treated as per se violations of the Sherman Act. Verti-
cal restraints, because they allow each individual in the combination to become
more efficient in the distribution of his products, have been seen as promoting inter-
brand competition and are examined under the rule of reason standard. Appar-
ently this enhancement of interbrand competition more than makes up for the
possibility that vertical restraints may also reduce intrabrand competition by de-
creasing the number of sellers competing for a set number of buyers. M & H Tire
Co., 733 F.2d at 978 (citing Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131
(2d Cir. 1978)(en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1104
(1979)).
31. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
32. Id. at 100-01. The industry was intercollegiate athletics. The NCAA mar-
kets competition; it would be completely ineffective if there were no agreed upon
rules. Id. at 101. "A myriad of rules affecting such matters as the size of the field,
the number of players on a team... all must be agreed upon, and all restrain the
manner in which institutions compete." Id. Although it was reasonable to assume
that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA were justifiable and procompeti-
tive, because they enhance public interest, this particular regulation was not. Id. at
117. The restraints on football telecasts did not fit into the same mold as did the
rules defining the conditions of the contest, the eligibility of participants, or the
manner in which members of a joint enterprise share the responsibilities. Id. at 117
(emphasis added). The NCAA did not claim that its television plan was intended to
equalize competition within any one league. The plan was nationwide and there
was no single league or tournament in which all college football teams competed.
There was no evidence of any intent to equalize the strength of teams in different
divisions. Id. at 117-18.
33. Id. at 119-120. Id. at 120. See also Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 54.
34. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
35. Specifically, the Court stated that absence of procedural safeguards did not
determine the antitrust analysis; the antitrust laws did not themselves impose a re-
quirement of process on joint ventures. Id. at 293. The absence of procedural safe-
1990]
70 Entertainment, Media & Intellectual Property Law Forun [Vol. 1
It held that the per se rule did not apply, absent a showing that the
challenged activity fell into a category likely to have predominantly
anticompetitive effects, such as an effort to disadvantage competi-
tors, that was not justified by efficiency.3 6 However, since the Court
found that consumption would actually increase if the controls were
removed, the Court concluded that the controls did not serve any
such legitimate purpose.
In 1986,37 the Supreme Court declined to apply the per se rule to
what appeared to be a group boycott. 3s After applying the rule of
reason, the Court concluded that the restriction of consumer choice,
absent procompetitive justification, violated the Sherman Act.3 9
III. "PER SE" ILLEGALITY OR "RULE OF REASON" AS
APPLIED TO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Sports eligibility rules require the players to meet certain require-
ments, such as attain a certain age, before they can compete. Since
the league, the teams, and the players' associations agree on these
rules, to those excluded, it seems like a group boycott. Initially, the
courts frequently applied the per se rule to sports eligibility rules,
labeling them per se illegal group boycotts and performing no fur-
ther analysis.
However, the recent trend has been to assume that the rule of rea-
son applies, and then determine whether the particular restraint is
reasonable. Most courts now recognize that some rules are neces-
sary for teams or individuals to compete in a league or association.
In addition, usually the league or team challenged for applying the
rule is not strictly a "competitor," and thus the refusal to deal would
constitute at most a vertical boycott. Vertical restraints have been
given the benefit of the doubt much more so than horizontal re-
straints, since the pro-competitive justifications are more easily un-
derstood, and usually more valid.
The courts' fluctuation between applying the per se rule and the
rule of reason in sports eligibility rule cases is evident from the fol-
guards could be used to determine if the regulatory body had exceeded the scope
of its authority.
36. Id. at 298. The mere allegation of a concerted refusal to deal was not
enough.
37. See F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
38. The Court noted that the group boycott category was not to be indiscrimi-
nately expanded, and was limited to the situation where a firm with market power
boycotts suppliers or customers to discourage them from doing business with a
competitor. Id. at 458. See also Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. 285.
39. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 466. See also, notes 16 and 30,
supra. A procompetitive justification is one which overcomes the anticompetitive
effect of the group boycott; e.g. the creation of efficiencies in the operation of the
market. Id. at 459.
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lowing analysis.4 °
As early as 1953, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 4 1 recog-
nized that professional teams in a league should not be permitted to
compete too strenuously with each other in a business way. If all the
teams were to do so, the strongest teams would likely drive the
weaker ones into financial failure, and eventually the whole league
would fail. Without the league no team could operate profitably.' 2
Thus acknowledging the unique nature and purpose of sports
league activities, the court held the per se rule inappropriate and
inapplicable to sports league activities.' 3 However, not many other
courts were quick to follow.
In two bowling association cases, both the 9th Circuit44 and a
California district court4 applied the per se rule. The California
district court stated that the eligibility rule had as one of its purposes
inducement of a concerted refusal to deal, and as such, was an ille-
gal boycott. 4 Citing Klor's, the court found that it was not relevant
that the eligibility rule had no effect on competition. The particular
practice, by its nature, tended to lessen competition and create a
monopoly, and it was enough to show that either the purpose or the
means was unlawful. 47 The circuit court also cited Kor's, and re-
jected defendant's claim that it had the right to impose restrictions to
prevent cheating and other abuses, even though such restrictions
might incidentally constrict commerce. 48 The court also cited Fash-
ion Originators' Guild, stating that a private association could not
pass regulations to deal with abuses when the effect was to restrain
interstate commerce.' 9
However, less than one month later, the same circuit applied the
40. The cases are presented in the order they were decided to illustrate the state
of confusion between the different districts.
41. United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa.
1953).
42. Id. at 323.
43. Id. at 322.
44. See Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356
F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966).
45. See People v. Santa Clara Valley Bowling Proprietors' Ass'n, 238 Cal. App.
2d 225, 47 Cal. Rptr. 570 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1965).
46. Santa Clara Valley, 238 Cal. App. 2d at 238-40, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80. It
induced league bowlers bowling in non-member alleys to bowl in member alleys
by requiring such as a precondition for tournament eligibility. 238 Cal. App.2d at
288, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
47. Id. at 240, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
48. Washington, 356 F.2d at 376. This argument has been accepted in subse-
quent cases to justify the use of the rule of reason. It is possible that these particular
restraints would have failed a rule of reason analysis, so the court did not want to be
bothered.
49. Id. (citing Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 459
(1941)). This argument has also subsequently been rejected.
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rule of reason.50 Although not stating the rule by name, the court
looked at the basic purpose of the eligibility rules and determined
that they were reasonable. 1
Similarly, the rule of reason was applied by the Southern District
of Indiana,52 when it acknowledged the right and power of the
United States Auto Club (USAC), as a sanctioning organization, to
adopt rules and regulations for its membership club." This reason-
ing seemed to set the stage for future challenges to sports associa-
tion self-regulation.
In contrast, the Central District of California5 4 started its analysis
by assuming that the per se rule applied and then used Silver to
determine if the regulation could escape per se treatment.55 The
court developed a test based on Silver that has been adopted by
many other courts.5, To qualify for this exception to the per se rule,
several prerequisites must be met:
(1) There must be a legislative mandate for self-regulation or
otherwise;
(2) There must be collective action that is (a) intended to accom-
plish an end consistent with the policy justifying self-regulation,
(b) reasonably related to that goal, and (c) no more extensive than
necessary;
(3) The association must provide procedural safeguards which as-
sure that the restraint is not arbitrary and which furnishes a basis
for judicial review;5 7
50. See Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S.1032 (1967).
Washingron was decided on Feb. 2, 1966; Deesen was decided on Feb. 23, 1966.
However, all of the judges hearing the cases were different. Washington was before
Judges Barnes, Koelsch and Browning. Deesen was before Judges Chambers,
Hamley and Ely.
51. Deesen, 358 F.2d at 170.
52. See STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ind.
1968).
53. Id. at 151. The court stated that "a court should interfere only if it finds that
the powers were exercised in an unlawful, arbitrary or malicious fashion and in
such a manner as to affect the property rights of the one who complains.. ." Id. The
court recognized that the USAC had the right to legislate to perpetuate its exist-
ence, and provide for competitive equivalency. Moreover, no court had the right to
step in and dictate to the sophisticated group of elected officials who sanction
sports. Id.
54. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc', 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D.
Cal. 1971).
55. Id. at 1066. By this route, if it was determined that the regulation could
escape per se treatment, then procompetitive justifications would be considered
before the regulation could be struck down.
56. See, e.g., Gunter Har Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 1103, 1116 (D. Neb.), afl'd, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981); Linseman v.
World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (D. Conn. 1977).
57. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1064-65. Since there was no provision in
the NBA by-laws for even the most rudimentary hearing before the four-year col-
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After holding that the Silver exception did not apply,"8 the court
considered the justifications for the rules 9 and determined that they
were invalid. Although the court stated otherwise,6" it appears to
have gone through a rule of reason analysis.6
The Northern District of California6 2 further analyzed the ration-
ale for the rule of reason. The court suggested that the field of
sports league activities was unique in that, in order to achieve
evenly matched teams on the field,63 there must be some restrictions
on the rights of the clubs to hire players and on the rights of the
players to sign with the teams of their choice. The application of an
absolute per se rule to all league restrictions precluded players and
clubs from negotiating for rules of mutual interest. Such restrictions
were just as well, if not better, evaluated under the rule of reason.6 4
In contrast, the Southern District of New York6 1 chose to apply the
per se rule to a similar eligibility provision.66 The court acknowl-
edged that some degree of economic cooperation, which is inher-
ently noncompetitive, might be essential for the survival of
competitive professional sports leagues.6 7 However, this rationale
did not insulate the leagues from the antitrust laws, since less drastic
protective measures were available. 8
The court for the District of Connecticut applied the per se rule to
an age eligibility rule. 69 Although the court labeled the practice
lege rule was applied to exclude an individual player, the Silver exception did not
apply. In addition, the rules were overly broad. Id. at 1066.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1066.
60. Id. The court stated that it could determine the case without a lengthy fac-
tual inquiry and complex balancing of values, since it did not fall within the narrow
Silver exception which dictated a rule of reason analysis.
61. The purpose of the per se rule is to avoid this type of in-depth analysis.
62. See Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Ca. 1974),
afH'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979).
63. Id. at 81.
64. Id. at 82.
65. Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
66. Id. at 893. Citing K)or's, the court struck down the NBA player draft and
perpetual reserve system. The court found the two control mechanisms analogous
to price-fixing devices, long ago deemed per se violative of the Sherman Act. The
measures allowed competing teams to eliminate competition when hiring players
and invariably lowered the cost of doing business. See also United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). The Robertson court stated that the restrictions could be
viewed as devices creating illegal horizontal territorial allocations and product
market divisions.
67. Id. at 892.
68. Id. The court cited to S. Esp. No. 92-1151 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) as an
example of less restrictive alternatives. Section 4 of that report deals with players'
freedom to contract and imposes a $50,000 fine, imprisonment up to one year, or
both for violating or conspiring to violate the prohibitions against restricting a
player's freedom after a particular contract has expired.
69. See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
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per se illegal, it then analyzed the Denver Rockets exception factors
and considered the alleged justifications.7" The court distinguished
the case from rule of reason cases upholding a rule as justified. The
court found the age eligibility rule to be arbitrary, since there was
no valid purpose or justification for it.71
On the other hand, the District of Columbia 72 held that the draft
was not a group boycott or, if it was, it was not the type of boycott
that traditionally had been held illegal per se and therefore it would
be more appropriate to test it under the rule of reason." The court
stated that the group boycott designation, which elicits invocation of
the per se rule, "should not be applied.., to concerted refusals that
are not designed to drive out competitors, but to achieve some other
goal,"74 since "the need for cooperation among participants neces-
sitates some type of concerted refusal to deal."17 5 In addition, be-
cause the rule was not "without any redeeming virtue" and tlUs
courts have had little experience with this type of restraint, the court
decided that a rule of reason analysis should be performed before
declaring the provision illegal.76
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit 77 held that an exclusivity by-law was
not per se illegal since it was not motivated by anticompetitiveness.
Any anticompetitive effect was at most de minimi and incidental to
the primary purpose of promoting safety. 78
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania 79 has continued to apply the
The World Hockey Association (WHA) had required players to be at least 20 years
old before they could play professional hockey for any team in the WHA. This
effectively made them ineligible for the WHA draft.
70. Id. at 1322.
71. Id. at 1321. For example, in Deesen, it was held legitimate to restrict the
number of participants in a golf tournament in order that all the entrants could
complete the course in daylight hours. See Deesen at 170.
72. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
73. Id. at 1178-79. The court stated that the NFL player draft differed from the
classic group boycott in two significant respects. First, the NFL clubs which had
combined to implement the draft were not competitors in an economic sense. The
clubs operate basically as a joint venture in producing football games, and no NFL
club could produce this product without agreements with other teams. Secondly,
the NFL draft differs because the NFL clubs have not combined to exclude compet-
itors or potential competitors from their level of the market. The draft was designed
not to insulate the NFL from competition, but to improve the entertainment product
by enhancing its teams' competitive equality.
74. Id. at 1180.
75. Id. at 1180. To this end, the NFL not only determines playing schedules and
broadcast terms, but also ensures that the clubs receive equal shares of broadcast
and ticket revenues.
76. Id. at 1182.
77. See Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979).
78. Id. at 1300.
79. See Nilon v. Philadelphia Section Professional Golfers' Ass'n., 1979-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) P62,961 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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rule of reason, despite a defendant's intent to restrict the level of
competition, because it is "proper" to protect fair competition in
sports. The Seventh,s ° Eighth,81 and First8 2 Circuits have also ap-
plied the rule of reason after stating that the Silver exception
applied.
Thus, the trend in federal district and appellate courts is toward a
rule of reason analysis, based on the Supreme Court's use of "or
other" in Silver, and the courts' reasoning that in the sports context,
various agreed-upon, seemingly anticompetitive, procedures may
be essential. However, as recently as 1984, the per se rule was still
applied.8 3
While a number of courts have "refused to employ a rule of rea-
son analysis in a sports context unless first convinced that the sports
regulation 'passes' [the] three-part [per se] test articulated in Denver
Rockets," other courts have used the Denver test as a part of the rule
of reason analysis, and still others have said that it does not matter
which way the test is applied as long as it is applied in some way.
8 4
Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Northwest Wholesale, it
appears that too much dependence has been placed on the Silver
exception. However, as long as a rule of reason analysis is per-
formed, the same party will most likely prevail with or without
Silver.
IV. SPECIFIC ELIGIBILITY RULES CHALLENGED
Over the years various types of rules have been challenged. A
sample of these rules as well as the decisions regarding them
follows. 85
80. See United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, Inc., 665 F.2d
781 (7th Cir. 1981).
81. See Gunter Har Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, Inc., 665 F.2d
222 (8th Cir. 1981).
82. See M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973 (lst Cir.
1984).
83. See Boris v. United States Football League, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
P66,012 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (court held USFL Four/Five Year Rule as per se illegal
group boycott, but action was dismissed pursuant to agreement between parties).
84. See M & H Tire Co., 733 F.2d at 980-81. See also note 54, supra.
85. Due to the different effects of each rule, and the different justifications, it is
difficult to generalize about all of them. However, it appears that they can be
grouped by the type of restraint, as opposed to the sport involved (except for base-
ball, which is almost always exempt). Thus the four-year rule will be treated the
same, whether the league being challenged is the NFL, NBA or defunct ABA. Simi-
larly, restraints on products used in a sport, i.e., a tennis racket, an engine, a tire,
etc., have been treated the same. Lastly, sports that require exclusion for a particu-
lar event, i.e., a specific golf or tennis tournament, have been treated differently
than a permanent exclusion from a league (4-year college rule and 20-year-old
rule), due to the difference in justifications raised. However, it is important to note
the date that the rule was challenged, since the thrust of the enforcement of the
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A. Billiards: Endorsement of Sponsor's Equipment Required
The defendant in Greenleaf v. BrUnSWick-BalkeCollender Co. 86
was a manufacturer of billiards equipment. Defendant created the
Billiards Association of America as a promotion vehicle to conduct
tournaments.8 7 Plaintiff alleged that, to be eligible to play in the
tournament, the association required players to use defendant's
equipment, as well as grant the association permission to use their
names for testimonial purposes related to the defendant's business
activities.8 8 Plaintiff, a professional billiards player, claimed that he
was denied entry because he had played exhibition matches ar-
ranged by a wholesaler who did not sell defendant's products.89
The court stated that defendant could not legally discriminate
against or refuse to deal with plaintiff without sufficient cause.90
B. Bowling: Bowling Alley Membership Requirement
In both Washington State Bowling Proprietors9 l and Santa Clara
Valley Bowling Proprietors',9 2 the courts held that a rule requiring
league bowlers to bowl in membership alleys was a group boycott
which violated the antitrust laws.
In Washington, the defendants conducted, sponsored and sanc-
tioned bowling tournaments whereby the only persons eligible to
participate were those who restricted their league bowling and tour-
nament bowling entirely to establishments which were members of
three specific associations."3 These eligibility rules deprived non-
member establishments of the patronage of persons who wished to
engage in organized bowling, enforced a boycott against non-mem-
ber establishments, suppressed competition and monopolized the
bowling industry, all in violation of the Sherman Act."'
In Santa Clara Valley, the association's rule required that tourna-
ment participants bowl regularly in at least one league in a member-
antitrust laws has changed over the years. This is further developed in section V of
this paper.
86. Greenleaf v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 79 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa.
1947).
87. Id. at 363.
88. Id. at 363-64.
89. Id. at 364.
90. Id. at 365. And because "the plaintiff should not be prevented from proffer-
ing evidence to establish a fact which the jury may infer from the circumstances,"
namely, that the defendant was "unjustified in barring (plaintiff] from the tourna-
ment," the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. The case is
unreported.
91. Washington, 356 F.2d at 371.
92. Santa Clara Valley, 238 Cal. App. 2d at 239-40, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80.
93. Washington, 356 F.2d at 374.
94. Id. at 374 (quoting from the appellee's Brief at pp. 3-4).
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ship house.95 The fact that the bowler was not required to bowl all
of his league games in a member establishment did not exempt the
eligibility rule from condemnation.96
C. Golf: Tournament Entry Eligibility Rules
In Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America 97 a profes-
sional golfer claimed that the Professional Golfers' Association's
(PGA) rules for entry into PGA sponsored tournaments violated the
antitrust laws. In order to compete in PGA golf tournaments, a
player had to either be a member of the PGA98 or an approved tour-
nament player.99
The court found reasonable the PGA's requirement that persons
who seek approved tournament standing must meet certain stan-
dards and obtain committee approval.100 The court was persuaded
that the differentiation between PGA members and nonmembers re-
garding the automatic right to participate in tournaments did not
have the purpose or effect of suppressing competition. 10 1 The
PGA's creation of the category of approved tournament player pro-
moted competition by facilitating participation by proficient
younger players who might not be eligible to join for PGA member-
ship.10 2 Deesen's recent tournament record provided ample basis
for striking him from the approved tournament players, as did his
95. Santa Clara Valley, 238 Cal. App. 2d at 229, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
96. Id. at 238-39, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 579. Although the result would probably
have been the same, it is important to note that in both of these cases, the court
applied the per se rule. Both courts did, to some extent, evaluate and then reject
the justifications raised by the defendant.
97. 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966). The PGA spon-
sors or co-sponsors substantially all professional golf tournaments in the United
States. Id. at 166.
98. Id. at 166. To become a PGA member a person must have five years of
experience, either in the employ of a golf club as a professional or assistant, or as a
tournament player under an agreement with the PGA, playing in a minimum of 25
tournaments per year. The plaintiff refused to work as a golf club professional. Id.
at 167.
99. Id. at 166. To be an approved tournament player requires that the applicant
has, in the opinion of committee: 1) the ability to play golf and finish in the money
in tournaments in which he competes, 2) the financial responsibility to undertake
the golf tours, and 3) moral character and integrity. Id. at 167. Plaintiff had been
an approved tournament player, but was terminated for poor performance. Id. at
168.
100. Id. at 170. The PGA determined it was necessary to limit tournament entry
because only a maximum of 160 golfers could compete in a tournament during
daylight hours. Id. at 167.
101. Id. at i70-71. The fact that members are entitled to play in the PGA spon-
sored tournaments without qualifications was not discrimination since membership
in the PGA was open to all persons on the same conditions. Id. at 168.
102. Id. at 171.
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performance during test rounds set up for his benefit.10 3 The court
held that the PGA was entitled to adopt reasonable measures for
confining its tournament enrollment to a manageable number.'"°
In Nilon v. Philadelphia Section Professional Golfers' Ass'n,05 a
professional golfer claimed that the Professional Golfers' Associa-
tion's (PGA) regulation, which excluded him from competing in
75% of the PGA's sectional events, violated the Sherman Act.' 0 6
The plaintiff was ineligible because he had participated in greater
than 12 National Tournament events.10 7 The court upheld the rule
as reasonable, despite the PGA's intent to restrict the level of com-
petition, because the restriction was based on a legitimate distinc-
tion between the professional golfer and the club professional.'
The plaintiff could have elected not to compete on the national tour
and only in sectional tournaments.10 9
D. Tennis: Tournament Eligibility
Heldman v. United States Lawn Tennis Ass'n" ° involved the
United States Lawn Tennis Association's (USLTA) promulgation of
rules and regulations for approving tennis tournaments."' The
plaintiffs in the case claimed that the USLTA's rules violated the an-
titrust laws by threatening to bar professional female tennis players
who participated in events which were not sanctioned by the
USLTA.11 2 The court held that there were sound reasons for the
103. Id. at 172. Also, he could still engage in such tournaments if he chose to
become a golf teacher at a golf club. Id.
104. Id.
105. 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P62,961 at 79,482 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
106. Id. at 79,484. The exclusionary regulation provided that "[a]ny PGA Tour
Member who has played in more than 12 PGA Tour events in the preceding 12
months is ONLY eligible for Philadelphia Section Championship events ... " Id. at
79,483 (emphasis in original). The PGA sponsored approximately 40 sectional
events; only nine were championships in which plaintiff was eligible to play, due to
the exclusionary rule. Id.
107. Id. at 79,483.
108. Id. at 79,485. The professional golfer generally competed in national tour-
naments. The club professional generally taught golf at a club, and only played in
local tournaments. Since the caliber of play was higher for professional golfers, the
exclusion of professional golfers from local tournaments made the tournaments
more evenly matched.
109. Id. at 79,486.
110. 354 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
111. Id. at 1244.
112. Id. at 1243. According to the USLTA rules, "a Professional Player is eligi-
ble to participate in sanctioned USLTA tournaments if that player has played only
in tournaments sanctioned by the USLTA. Should that player participate in a 'non-
sanctioned' event, in which prize money is awarded, that player may be assigned
the status of a contract pro, in which event he or she may participate only in those
USLTA tournaments which are designated 'open for all categories' of players."
(emphasis in original). Id. at 1244.
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USLTA's rules which were not anticompetitive.' 1 3 These included
the uniformity of playing rules so that players could be ranked, the
orderly scheduling of tournaments to accommodate players' needs,
and the provision of high caliber tennis competition for public en-
joyment.11 Although broad, the regulation was upheld as reason-
able 1 5 because the evidence was insufficient to prove that the
USLTA would not allow these players to participate in open tourna-
ments, 1 16 and because the USLTA's prestige and operation would
have been unduly damaged if it was enjoined from regulating play-
ers in this manner. 117
E. Horse Racing: Eligibility Rule
The United States Trotting Association's (USTA) rules were up-
held by a district court in United States v. United States Trotting
Ass'n 1s The purpose of the rules was to regulate and standardize
harness racing and promote competition in the sport.' 19 The court
found that any restraint was incidental to the USTA's reasonable ac-
tivities. 120 These rules were questioned again by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 121 but
no final decision was reached on the merits because the court found
that the district court had incorrectly applied the per se rule.122
F. Automobile Racing: Engine Restrictions
In STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club, Inc.,2 - the plaintiff
claimed, inter alia, that the United States Auto Club (USAC) had
violated the Sherman Act by (1) adopting unreasonable rules
through the use of its monopoly power, and (2) by discriminating
113. Id. at 1244.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1252.
116. Id. at 1250. The opinion was written upon plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment.
117. Id. at 1252-53. However, the court stated that it would take note of future
decisions of the USLTA, scrutinizing the rules and procedures, should any players
be ruled ineligible for USLTA events. Although reasonable rules are vital to the
orderly preservation of tournament tennis, rules defeating competition cross the
line of legality. Id. at 1252.
118. 1960 Trade Can. (CCH) P69,761, 76,954 (S.D. Ohio 1960). The United
States Trotting Association should not be confused with the Umted States Tennis
Association, both abbreviated USTA.
119. Id. at 76,957.
120. Id.
121. 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981). The USTA eligibility certificate application
states under Rule 5, section 1, that members are prohibited from racing horses at
meets not affiliated with the USTA. Members who violate this prohibition are sub-
ject to revocation of their eligibility. Id. at 785.
122. Id. at 790. The case was remanded and no subsequent opinion is reported.
123. 286 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ind. 1968).
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against plaintiff when applying its rules.' 2" The USAC imposed
safety regulations not only with respect to the running of racing
events, but also with respect to cars, engines, drivers and equip-
ment.125 For instance, the USAC Board adopted a rule restricting
the size of certain component parts for turbine engines, in order to
decrease the "power potential" of the engine, and thus ensure com-
petitive equivalency between turbine powered cars and piston pow-
ered cars.126 The district court, in upholding the Board's rule, found
that the USAC acted reasonably as it aimed merely to perpetuate
racing as a competitive sport. 127
G. Car Racing: Single-Tire Rule
In M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp.,'28 the court up-
held the "single tire rule," under which only one manufacturer's
model of tire could be used at a particular track during the racing
season.' 29 The plaintiff, a manufacturer of racing tires, had been
excluded from selling tires at four race tracks, after the tracks
adopted the single tire rule.
The court found that the single tire rule was not adopted for any
anticompetitive purpose. 13 0 The "exclusion" was "a by-product of a
sports-oriented decision to have all drivers at th[e] tracks race on a
single compound 13 1 in order to insure greater equality between
race participants," and, as well, reduce the expense of participating
in the sport.1
3 2
The restraint was questionable not because a single type of tire
had been selected, but because a single brand had been se-
124. Id. at 148.
125. Id. at 163. In its membership rules, the USAC reserved the right to revise its
rules, and to establish standards of eligibility for participation in competitions and
"to do any and all things which, in its judgment, are consistent with the enhance-
ment of automotive competitions." Id. at 156.
126. Id. at 157, 167. Apparently, when a turbine powered race car with a 21.9
square inch annulus was raced with other piston engine cars, "ilt demonstrated
such superior performance that the piston engine cars could not compete with it
and 'could not race with it."' Id. at 158. The court acknowledged that the USAC,
as sanctioning organization, had the right to legislate, and a court should not inter-
fere unless the powers have been exercised in an unlawful, arbitrary or malicious
fashion, none of which the court found. Id. at 151.
127. Id. "The quickest way to bring about the demise of racing would be to per-
mit... one car with superior qualities ... to eliminate competition." Id. at 151.
128. 733 F.2d at 973 (lst Cir. 1984).
129. Id. at 987. The tracks jointly engaged in a competitive bidding and testing
process, whereby one manufacturer was chosen to supply tires for all four tracks,
for the season. Id.
130. Id. at 980.
131. Id. Evidence indicated that "specifying a single brand was the only feasible
method to insure that a single rubber compound was being raced on." Id.
132. Id. This cost savings goal was achieved by specifying a low cost 13-inch
"budget" tire. Id. at 981.
Antitrust & Professional Sportfs' Eligibility Rules
lected.13 3 However, the court stated that this was a reasonable con-
trol, since there seemed to be no conceivable alternative scheme to
achieve the same goal of promoting participation parity which
would have a lesser effect on the market.1 3 4 The court found that
the agreement only foreclosed manufacturers from a minor portion
of the market, and only for one year at a time. 13s In addition, the
regulation enabled drivers to obtain lower prices in a legitimate
fashion. 138
H. Tennis Double-Strung Racket Rule
In Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 1 7 the
court upheld the United States Tennis Association's (USTA) rule
prohibiting the use of a certain double-strung tennis racket in sanc-
tioned tournaments. 1 3 , The defendant manufactured a prohibited
racket. The court held that the USTA legitimately functioned as a
regulating body to ensure that competitive tennis was conducted in
an orderly fashion, and to preserve the essential character of the
game as played in organized competition. 3 9 Furthermore, the court
found the USTA's racket regulation rationally related to these goals,
noting that it did not extend beyond what was necessary, and pro-
vided adequate procedural safeguards to protect against arbitrary
133. Id. at 984.
134. Id. at 984-85. The tracks and drivers are empowered to establish the param-
eters within which the racing competition will take place, including the permissible
range of gear ratios, allowable engine sizes, etc. Id. at 985. As the court noted,
standardizing the equipment would elevate the value of good driving skills over
that of equipment - a legitimate goal. Id.
135. Id. at 982.
136. Id. at 989.
137. 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981).
138. Rule 4 stated:
The Racket
The racket shall consist of a frame and a stringing.
The Frame
The frame may be of any material, weight, size or shape.
The Stringing
The strings must be alternately interlaced or bonded where they cross and
each string must be connected to the frame.
If there are attachments, they must be used only to prevent wear and tear
and must not alter the flight of the ball.
The density in the centre must be at least equal to the average density of
the stringing.
Note to the Rule: The spirit of this rule is to prevent undue spin on the ball
that would result in a change in the character of the game.
The stringing must be made so that the moves between the strings will not
exceed what is possible, for instance with 18 mains and 18 crosses uni-
formly spaced interlaced in a stringing area of 75 square inches.
Gunter Harz Sports v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp 1103, 1111 (D.
Neb.), aff'd, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981).
139. GunterHarz, 665 F.2d at 223.
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enforcement.1 4 ° Testing had shown that the new double-strung
racket significantly altered the spin on the ball, which changed the
way the game was played."1 The rule provided that a party could
obtain approval of his/her racket if he could show that the use of the
instrument did not "significantly change the character of the
game." 1 4
2
I. Basketball, Football and Hockey Eligibilty: The Draft,
the Reserve Clause, the Four-Year College Rule, the
Twenty-Year Rule
In the first of these cases, Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management,
Inc.,143 plaintiff Haywood challenged the eligibility rules for the
National Basketball Association (NBA) draft, claiming they effectu-
ated a group boycott.144 After playing college basketball for two
years, and professional basketball in the American Basketball Asso-
ciation (ABA) for one year, 45 plaintiff signed a contract to play bas-
ketball with an NBA team.14 6 However, the Commissioner of the
NBA disapproved the contract on the ground that Haywood was not
eligible under the four-year college rule. 147 Section 2.05,141 in
conjunction with Section 6.03,149 provided that no person was eligi-
140. Id.
141. GunterHarz, 511 F. Supp. at 1118.
142. Gunter Harz, 665 F.2d at 223.
143. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Ca. 1971).
144. Id. at 1060-61. The draft is the NBA player selection system.
145. He entered a contract with the Denver Rockets, a professional basketball
team in the American Basketball Association (ABA), pursuant to a "hardship" ex-
emption from the ABA's four-year college rule. Id.
146. Id. at 1060. The team was the Seattle Supersonics.
147. Id.
148. At the time, Section 2.05 of the by-laws of the NBA provided: "High School
Graduate, etc. A person who has not completed high school or who has completed
high school but has not entered college, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be
a Player until four years after he has been graduated or four years after his original
high school class has been graduated, as the case may be, nor may the future serv-
ices of any such person be negotiated or contracted for, or otherwise reserved.
Similarly, a person who has entered college but is no longer enrolled, shall not be
eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until the time when he would have first
become eligible had he remained enrolled in college. Any negotiations or agree-
ments with any such person during such period shall be null and void and shall
confer no rights whatsoever; nor shall a Member violating the provisions of this
paragraph be permitted to acquire the rights to the services of such person at any
time thereafter." Id. at 1059.
149. Section 6.03 further defined eligibility for the NBA, and: "Persons Eligible
for Draft. The following classes of persons shall be eligible for the annual draft:
(a) Students in four year colleges whose classes are to be graduated dur-
ing the June following the holding of the draft;
(b) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have already
been graduated, and who do not choose to exercise remaining collegiate
basketball eligibility;
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ble as a player, under any circumstances, until four years after his
original high school class had graduated.'Is Haywood was not eli-
gible, since only three years had transpired since his high school
graduation."51
Since the NBA and its teams refused to deal with those players
ineligible under the NBA's four-year college rule, the application of
the four-year college rule constituted a primary concerted refusal to
deal. 152
The court considered and rejected the justifications suggested by
the NBA for the four-year college rule.15 3 The court concluded that
the member teams had conspired not to deal with persons whose
high school classes were not four years beyond graduation; that the
NBA applied Sections 2.05 and 6.03 of its by-laws so as to render
Haywood ineligible to play in the NBA; and that the NBA had not
provided procedural safeguards whereby an individual might con-
test his exclusion.15 4 Thus, the court held that the NBA's four-year
college rule violated the Sherman Act.'
(c) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have already
been graduated if such students have no remaining collegiate basketball
eligibility;
(d) Persons who become eligible pursuant to the provisions of Section
2.05 of these By-laws." Id.
150. Id. Haywood had graduated from high school in 1967, and would not be
eligible to play in the NBA until the 1971-1972 season. Id. at 1060.
151. Id. at 1060.
152. Id. at 1061. The court delineated three harms resulting from such a boycott.
First, the victim of the boycott is injured by being excluded from the mar-
ket he seeks to enter. Second, competition in the market in which the vic-
tim attempts to sell his services is injured. Third, by pooling their
economic power, the individual members of the NBA have, in effect, es-
tablished their own private government.
Id.
The court further explained that "the rules ... are absolute and prohibit the
signing of not only college basketball players but also those who do not desire to
attend college, and even those who lack the mental and financial ability to do so.
As such, they are overly broad and thus improper under Silver." Id. at 1066.
153. Id. at 1066. First, the NBA suggested that the rule was financially necessary.
The court stated that, following Klor's, financial necessity did not provide a basis
for exemption from the antitrust laws. Second, the NBA claimed the regulation was
"necessary to guarantee that each prospective professional basketball player
[would] be given the opportunity to complete four years of college prior to begin-
ning his professional basketball career." The court stated that "[h]owever com-
mendable this desire may be," it was not in a position to override the antitrust laws.
Third, Haywood admitted that "collegiate athletics provide[d] a more efficient and
less expensive way of training young professional basketball players than the 'farm
team' system, which is the primary alternative. However, even if this were true, it
would not.., provide a basis for antitrust exemption." Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1067.
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Similarly, in Boris v. United States Football League,'S6 the court
held the United States Football League's (USFL) eligibility rule vio-
lated the Sherman Act. This rule also left potential players ineligi-
ble to play professionally until all of their college football eligibility
had expired.1 5 7
In Kapp v. National Football League, s5 the district court held
that several National Football League (NFL) rules, including the Ro-
zelle rule,1 5 9 the draft rule,'10 the tampering rule, 16 1 and the Stan-
dard Player Contract 162 were all unreasonable restraints of trade. 163
However, on appeal the entire antitrust issue was rendered moot
and thus not reviewed. 164
Not unexpectedly, the National Basketball Association's draft and
reserve clauses were the next to be challenged. In Robertson v. Na-
156. 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 66,012, P 68,463 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
157. The Eligibility Rule of the United States Football League (USFL), as it ex-
isted in 1983, and which provided as follows: "No person shall be eligible to play
or be selected as a player unless (1) all college football eligibility of such player
has expired, or (2) at least [five] years shall have elapsed since the player first en-
tered or attended a recognized junior college, college or university or (3) such
player received a diploma from a recognized college or university." Id. at 68,461-
62.
158. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), all'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979).
159. Kapp, 586 F.2d at 646. Even after a player becomes a free agent, another
club could not employ him until it made satisfactory arrangements with the former
employer club.
160. The draft rule in Article 14 of the NFL Constitution required that "at an
annual meeting the member clubs would select prospective players, principally
from the ranks of the outstanding college graduates." The rule had the effect of
precluding other teams from entering into negotiations with a particular player,
even if the selecting club and the player could not agree on a contract. Id. at 646.
161. "To prevent interference with the selecting club's right to its draft choices
and active players, the tampering rule of Article 9.2 provides that a club may not
negotiate with, or make an offer to, another team's player." Id. at 646.
162. "Before a player can participate in the NFL, he must sign a Standard Player
Contract. This was part of the 1968 and 1970 collective bargaining agreements,
and appeared in Article 15 of the 1971 NFL Constitution. The Contract provides
that the player becomes bound by the Constitution and By-Laws, the Rules of the
League, of the Club, and the decisions of the Commissioner of the League." No
collective bargaining agreement was in effect when plaintiff's cause of action
arose, so that the labor exemption did not apply. This could have placed the rules
outside the coverage of the antitrust laws. Id. at 646.
163. The court concluded that the option rule could not be found unreasonable
on partial summary judgment. The option rule gave the employing club a unilat-
eral right to renew a player's expired contract for an additional year at a reduced
rate of compensation, as low as 90% of his previous year's compensation. This rule
was intended to induce a player to renew his contract, and not play out his option so
as to be free to negotiate with other clubs. Id. at 646.
164. The NFL's cross-appeal was rendered moot by plaintiff's failure to prove he
was injured. Id. at 649-50.
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tional Basketball Ass'n,16 5 the plaintiff charged that the NBA rules
prevented any player from playing professional basketball for any
NBA club other than the team assigned exclusive rights to his serv-
ices for his lifetime. 166 The court opined, albeit in dictum, 167 that
practically all of the intra- and inter-league restraints were per se
violations of the Sherman Act.1 6 8
The perpetual reserve clause in the National Hockey League
(NHL) was also held in violation of the Sherman Act. In Boston Pro-
fessional Hockey Ass'n v. C!heevers,169 the court shot down the re-
serve clause which would have prevented a player from switching
to the World Hockey League. The plaintiff team had "not shown a
probability that these Standard Player's Contracts [would] be found
to be legally valid and enforceable in the face of the serious threat
to their legality posed by the provisions of the Sherman Act."' 170
Similarly, in Nassau Sports v. Hampson,172 the court ruled that the
reserve clause "seems, plausibly, one aspect of a contractual
scheme constituting a violation of... the Sherman Antitrust Act."1172
In a third case, Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia
Hockey Club, 17s the court concluded that, as a matter of law, both a
perpetual reserve system and one limited to three years' duration
violated the Sherman Act.
The World Hockey Association's (WHA) regulation prohibiting
persons under the age of twenty from playing professional hockey
was challenged in Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n 14 Plaintiff, a
nineteen-year-old amateur hockey player, had signed a contract to
play professional hockey for a WHA team, but the WHA claimed
that the contract was void under the "twenty year old rule." '
165. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
166. Id. at 874-75. "Whereas the reserve clause prevents teams from competing
for veteran players, the draft prevents bidding for rookies." The net effect is to
force a player to deal only with the NBA club which "owns" the rights to him, or not
play basketball in the NBA. Id. at 892. When a player signs the Uniform Contract,
he agrees to play ball only "for his Club or its assignees exclusively until 'sold' or
'traded'," the club is given the right to assign the contract, and the player agrees to
report to his new club within a specified period of time. Id. at 874. In addition, the
reserve clause binds the player to negotiate and deal only with the club which
contracted with the player. Id. at 874. After the contract's termination, the club
may unilaterally renew the player's obligation to play for that team for an addi-
tional year. Id. at 874.
167. The court had not yet heard a full trial on the merits. The opinion was written
denying defendant's motion for summary judgment.
168. 389 F. Supp. at 890-91.
169. 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972).
170. Id. at 268.
171. 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972).
172. Id. at 735.
173. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
174. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D.Conn. 1977).
175. Id. at 1318. Operating Regulation 17.2(a) reads: "(a) Each Member Club
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The court stated that enforcement of the rule constituted a group
boycott, since the rule had no valid purpose. 176 The court noted
that many teenagers have played in the professional ranks with dis-
tinction, and concluded that the rule was arbitrary. 177 The court re-
jected the WHA's justifications.17 1 In addition, the court
commented that there were no procedural safeguards 17 9 inherent in
the rule. The court concluded that the WHA's regulation appeared
to violate the antitrust laws. 8 0
The National Football League draft was again challenged in
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.""1 Plaintiff claimed that the 1968 draft
was an unreasonable restraint of trade, and that but for the draft, he
would have negotiated a far more lucrative contract.1'8 2 The court
held that the draft was anticompetitive both in its purpose and in its
effect, because it restricted competition among the NFL clubs for
services of graduating college players.18 3 It forced players to ded
with only one team, robbing them of any real bargaining power, and
shall make its selections from among the players who attain their twentieth (20th)
birthdays between January 1st, next preceding the conduct of the draft, and De-
cember 21st, next following the conduct of the draft both dates included." The
team was the Birmingham Bulls. Id. at 1318 n.3.
176. Id. at 1321. The individual teams could and should be left to determine
whom they desire, under the free market system. Id.
177. Id. at 1323.
178. First, the WHA claimed that it was- forced to adopt the rule on the threat that
foreign teams would not play against its teams otherwise. The court held that this
did not justify an antitrust violation. Id. at 1321. The Supreme Court has held that
"acquiescence in an illegal scheme is as much a violation of the Sherman Act as
the creation and promotion of one." United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S.
131 (1948)(cited in Linseman at 1322). Second, the WHA's suggested the rule was
necessary to foster the Canadian junior hockey league, from which the WHA and
NHL drew much of their talent. This was invalid too, since the antitrust laws did not
admit exceptions for economic necessity. "Exclusion of traders from the market by
means of combination... is not to be saved by reference to the need to preserve
the collaborators' profit margins." United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S.
127, 146 (1966)(cited in Linseman at 1322). But if the WHA needed a training
ground for its prospective players, it should bear the cost and establish its own farm
system. 439 F. Supp. at 1322.
179. 439 F.Supp. at 1322. The WHA By-Laws provided a procedure whereby a
player may submit any contract objection to the Executive Committee, but since the
by-laws had no exception provision (like the ABA hardship exception), the board
was powerless to alter the rule. Id.
180. Id. at 1325. The preliminary injunction for the plaintiff was granted.
181. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
182. Id. at 1174. Smith had only signed a one year contract, before he was in-jured; he claimed that in a free market he could have negotiated a three-year con-
tract with an injury protection clause, guaranteeing him payment for the full
contract term. Id. at 1177.
183. Id. at 1185. Under the draft, the right to negotiate with any given player is
exclusively held by one team at any given time. If the college player cannot reach
a satisfactory agreement with that team, he cannot play in the NFL. Id. at 1176.
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lowering salary levels of the best college players.1 8 4 The court re-
jected the defendant's justifications.' The NFL's argument was es-
sentially that competition in the market would not serve the best
interests of the public, the clubs, or the players themselves.18 6 The
court concluded that the present restriction was a total ban on com-
petition which could not be justified, since there were significantly
less anticompetitive alternatives.18 7
J. Hockey: Two-Eye Rule
In Neeld v. National Hockey League, 88 the court upheld a Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL) by-law"8 9 which prohibited the plain-
tiff, a one-eyed hockey player, from participating.190 The court was
convinced that the by-law was not motivated by anticompetitive-
ness; rather, the primary purpose was to promote safety, both to the
plaintiff and his fellow players.' 9 ' The court noted that ice hockey
was a very rough, physical contact sport, and that there was bound
to be danger to players who were on Neeld's blind side.'9 2 The
court also acknowledged potential personal injury suits as a legiti-
mate concern.
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Chicago School philosophy is that the antitrust laws concern
only allocative and productive efficiency.19 3 Under its analysis, a
court balances the output-restricting effects of the league's regula-
184. Id. at 1185.
185. The justifications asserted for the draft were that it had the legitimate busi-
ness purposes of promoting "competitive balance" and playing field equality
among the teams, producing better entertainment for the public, producing higher
salaries for the players, and increasing financial security for the clubs. Id. at 1186.
But the draft was not "procompetitive" in an economic sense; it did not encourage
others to enter the market or offer the product at a lower cost. Thus, the procompe-
titive effects were nil regarding economic antitrust considerations. Id.
186. Id. at 1186. This is precisely the type of argument that the Supreme Court
rejected in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 695 (1978), stating that it is "nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic
policy of the Sherman Act."
187. Id. at 1187. Interestingly, the court did not foreclose the possibility that
some type of player selection system might be defended as regulating and promot-
ing competition in the market for players' services, given the joint-venture status of
the NFL clubs. Id.
188. 594 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1979).
189. The NHL's by-law 12.6 provided: "A player with only one eye, or one of
whose eyes has a vision of only three-sixtieths or under, shall not be eligible to play
for a Member Club."
190. Neeld, 594 F.2d at 1298.
191. Id. at 1300.
192. Id.
193. Heidt, Don't Talk Fairness: The Chicago School's Approach Toward Disci-
plining Professional Athletes, 61 Irn. L.J. 53 (1985) [Hereinafter Heidt]. Although
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tion (the harm to allocative efficiency) against the efficiency enhanc-
ing effects (the gain to production efficiency). The Chicago School
tends to see little harm to allocative efficiency and substantial gain
to productive efficiency, regardless of whether a restraint would be
characterized as a horizontal or vertical boycott.19
The association of teams and players produces a product, the
sporting event, which competes with other forms of entertainment.
Thus, the formation of the league increases competition in the en-
tertainment industry. Forming a league also enhances efficiency,
since the product, the particular professional sports event, probably
would not exist absent such combination. Although this association
also increases the league's ability to restrict output, doing so would
usually be seen as detrimental to its interest.19 In addition, this
ability might be viewed as ancillary, since it is incidental to the main
purpose of the integration. The Chicago School does not imp'y
harm to efficiency merely from the league's power, nor from the ar-
bitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness of its actions. 196
Unless an exclusion affects a substantial number of potential play-
ers, it will have a minimal effect on output and price, the key criteria
used by the Chicago School.1 97 The league hurts itself if it excludes
highly demanded players, since it reduces the demand for its prod-
uct. Thus, if it excludes a player, the league will probably have
some efficiency-enhancing reason for doing so, which more than off-
sets the welfare loss from the slight reduction in output. 198 More
importantly, the harm to output must be gauged with reference to
the market in which the league's product is consumed, not with ref-
erence to the players themselves. 199
Ironically, since a sports league's action would be efficiency-en-
hancing whenever it lowers the cost or increases the demand for the
products of the league or of its members, this implies that the league
could exclude any player whenever it thought the exclusion would
help to increase the marketability of the product.20 °
The player will only be able to prevail when the league has no
this article discusses disciplinary rules, the principles are equally applicable to eli-
gibility rules.
194. Id. at 55.
195. This would be true unless it had no competition and could operate as a
monopoly.
196. Heidt, aupra note 193, at 56.
197. This sharply contrasts the analysis and reasoning in Klor's, where the Court
stated the elimination of even one competitor was enough to prove a violation of
the Sherman Act, even without any effect on the market. 359 U.S. at 213.
198. Heidt at 56.
199. Id. at 57.
200. Id. at 58. Thus, if a sport was dominated by one player or team, the league
could exclude this player or team, on the ground that better competition would
increase consumer demand.
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plausible efficiency justification. For example, a rule that required
bowlers to bowl all their games in membership alleys to be eligible
to participate in a tournament might still be held violative, since it
would reduce output with no conceivable efficiency gain.2 0 1 Simi-
larly, player challenges to the four-year college rule applied in bas-
ketball and football, and the 20-year old rule applied in hockey,
might still be successful if the leagues are not creative enough to
concoct an efficiency-enhancing justification, i.e., how the rule low-
ered cost, increased demand, etc.
However, a court faced with a league rule which is clearly arbi-
trary and unfair may feel obligated to help the player(s). Thus, the
Chicago School approach may lead to many cases, which previ-
ously would have been decided on antitrust grounds, now being de-
cided under tort, property, or contract law, where "fairness" is an
appropriate objective.20 2
VI. CONCLUSION
A player challenging a professional sports league or association
regulation will likely have no problem convincing a court that an
antitrust issue exists, since both concerted conduct and an effect on
interstate commerce are easily proven. The court should apply the
rule of reason, since the "case involves an industry in which horizon-
tal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
available at all.'203
However, with the recent impact of the Chicago School ap-
proach, the concerns that the courts have addressed in the past may
be irrelevant.20 4 These concerns, which included whether the
league's action was "arbitrary", "unreasonable", or "unnecessary"
in light of alternative actions available, usually led to a victory for
the plaintiff. Under the Chicago School approach, the player is
very likely to lose.205
Cathy E. Shore
201. The output, the number of games bowled, is not necessarily decreased be-
cause the games are bowled in member versus non-member houses. However, if a
bowler would normally bowl in a non-member house since it is convenient, and
does not because of the eligibility rule, output is reduced.
202. Heidt at 64.
203. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101
(1984).
204. Heidt at 54.
205. Id. at 55.
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